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Abstract
The article analyses China’s 16+1 and Belt and Road initiatives from Latvia’s perspective. Although 
the initiatives provide engagement on a large scale, it is challenging to achieve the task of achieving 
a synergy between a variety of stakeholders and interests in the context of a diversity of visions and 
agendas. The strategic dimension of transcontinental initiatives complicates further the building of 
synergy. Connectivity is an important and promising principle of both initiatives and transcontinental 
infrastructural linkages are especially high on the agenda. Mutually beneficial progress, however, 
must yet be achieved. In times of uncertainty, Central and Eastern European countries, including 
Latvia, are engaged in a balancing process of potential economic benefits and strategic implications 
of the 16+1 and Belt and Road initiatives.  
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The Summit of China and Central and Eastern European countries in Riga 
in November 2016 became a formative and symbolic experience for 
Latvia, in the context of its relationship with China. Hosting the summit was 
perceived and framed in Latvia as extending and deepening the country’s 
engagement and mutual trust-building with China. The gathering of 
representatives from China and Central and Eastern European countries 
was also considered as an opportunity to take economic and diplomatic 
advantage of the 16+1 partnerships and China’s ambitious Belt and Road 
Initiative (Kučinskis 2016). At the same time, the summit in Riga provided 
an appropriate moment to reflect and assess the developments and 
prospects of both 16+1 and the Belt and Road Initiative. 
The article will analyse China’s two initiatives towards Central and Eastern 
Europe and beyond, from Latvia’s perspective. In order to achieve this goal 
several research questions must be addressed: Who are the stakeholders 
and what are their interests in an intensifying interaction between China 
and Central and Eastern European countries in general, and Latvia in 
particular? How is connectivity, as one of the major declared objectives 
of the two initiatives, being deliberated and implemented? What is the 
strategic context for the 16+1 and Belt and Road Initiatives? 
The paper is structured corresponding to the above questions. The first 
part of the paper focuses on the challenging task of charting the diversity 
of visions, agendas and interests involved in the two initiatives. It outlines 
both the opportunities and constraints to the synergy between a variety 
of stakeholders and interests. The second section elaborates on the 
important principle of connectivity. Although connectivity may embrace 
a number of aspects, the main attention here is on the developing 
economic and infrastructural linkages, as they can readily demonstrate 
concrete practical steps and achievements. The last part of the paper 
analyses the strategic dimension of transcontinental initiatives. In times 
of uncertainty, Central and Eastern European countries, including Latvia, 
must increasingly take into account both the economic benefits and 
strategic implications of the 16+1 and Belt and Road Initiatives.  
The paper is based on a growing number of scientific and analytical 
resources. Scientific literature on China’s international ambitions and 
activities is abundant (Lanteigne 2016; Carver 2016; Tan Li, Larry D. Qui 
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and Ying Xue 2016). With the advent of the New Silk Road idea, scientific 
research focused specifically on China’s “going out” strategy is rapidly 
increasing (Godement and Kratz 2015; Hongying Wang 2016; Wang 
Yiwei 2016; Ghiasy and Jiayi Zhou 2017). However, the analysis of the role, 
place, and perspectives of the Central and Eastern European countries 
vis-à-vis China’s ambitious initiatives is more fragmentary. The distribution 
and scope of research findings on Central and East European countries 
relations with China remains rather limited and unevenly spread among 
the countries and institutions in the region. At the same time, “islands” of 
regional expertise on relations with China in Central and Eastern Europe 
are forming. These islands look beyond bilateral interaction and place the 
16+1 format into a wider context. Among the CEE countries, Poland has 
demonstrated increasing capacity and resources in assessment of China’s 
strategy and activities, including in the Central and Eastern European 
region  (Jakoby 2016; Kaczmarski 2016; Jakobowski 2015; Szczudlik 2016). 
Moreover, opportunities and constraints for synergies with China’s various 
initiatives have also been discussed by Chinese counterparts (Liu Zuokui 
2016a; 2016b). The research in the Baltic countries essentially reflects 
thoroughly on China’s motivations and the implications for the Baltic states 
and the wider region (Andrijauskas 2015). Analysis in, and on, Latvia in the 
context of China’s initiatives fits into this regional picture and necessitates 
further research. Most research activity in Latvia on China’s global and 
regional initiatives has been carried out under the auspices of the Latvian 
Institute of International Affairs (Andžāns and Sprūds 2016). 
Managing diversity: visions, agendas and interests
A strategic vision is indispensable for a transcontinental, inter-civilizational, 
and infrastructural endeavour on the scale envisaged by China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative. China’s opening towards the West is based on the win-win 
philosophy of mutual understanding, respect and benefit (Li Keqiang 2016). 
The initiative aims to contribute to the creation of an embracing, inclusive, 
and pluralistic community. The Belt and Road Initiative has facilitated a 
mental re-mapping of geographic space and has already gained the 
image of a grand engagement, inter-civilizational connectivity and 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (78) - 2017
40
mutual enrichment. Latvia has not been an exception here, experiencing 
an emergence of China on the country’s mental maps and political and 
business agenda in recent years (Martyn-Hemphill and Morisseau 2015). 
A grand design or grand dream clearly helps to establish a normative 
basis to drive forward the concrete initiatives and projects. Cooperation 
in the 16+1 format may be perceived as an integral part of the wider 
and more ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (Liu Zuokui 2016a). China’s 
Belt and Road Initiative involves allegedly 65 countries, and 16 of them 
are in Central and Eastern Europe. Central and Eastern Europeans see 
this as their opportunity to jointly appear on China’s political and business 
agenda. However, the complexity and challenge to harmonising the 
variety of visions, agendas and interests at play has apparently been 
unachievable in the process. Latvia has experienced a multifaceted 
trajectory in its opening to the East in general, and China in particular, 
during the last decade.  
Latvia’s active engagement with Asian countries essentially began with 
the country’s active participation in the Northern Distribution Network. The 
Northern Distribution Network became an important catalyst for opening 
to the East. In 2009 Latvia started to play a significant role in this network 
of transportation lines, launched and developed above all by the United 
States, to supply both its own and allied troops in Afghanistan (Rikveilis 2012: 
86). Latvia grew into one of the most central and dynamic supply routes 
to Afghanistan via Russia and Central Asian countries. Although Latvia’s 
visible role in the Network lasted a rather limited period of time from 2009 
until 2013, it had considerable conceptual and political implications. The 
participation in this transcontinental supply endeavour motivated Latvia’s 
decision-making and business community to think and act beyond the 
geographic and designed limits of the project. Commercialization of 
the existing network and extension of its connections to the immense 
economies of China and India increasingly entered Latvia’s diplomatic 
and business thinking and agenda (Andžāns 2013: 9-29). 
The importance of and adherence to the Trans-Atlantic dimension initially 
found its presence in the concept of the New Silk Road promoted by the 
United States (Starr 2007: 5-32). However, the limitations of the US New Silk 
Road initiative emerged soon (Standish 2014). The uncertainty of the US 
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initiative and the emerging prospective of economic opportunities in the 
context of China’s own Silk Road thinking, motivated Latvia, alongside 
Estonia and Lithuania, to join the format of 16+1 established in 2012. Taking 
into account China’s implicit objective to limit US presence in developing 
major mainland routes in Eurasia (Fallon 2015: 140-147), the evolution and 
pragmatic turn of Latvia’s and its partners’ positions become noticeable.
European necessities have provided another dimension to the somewhat 
challenging task of reconciling a variety of visions and agendas and 
promoting synergy in the context of the 16+1 format. 11 Central and 
East European countries of the format have become members of the 
European Union. This has added to the importance of the region in the 
eyes of the Chinese, whose regional presence may become a window 
of opportunity for them to shape relations with the EU. On the other hand, 
Central and East Europe has been perceived as an “outskirt” of the 
European Union, which is obliged to follow the Community’s requirements 
and instructions (Kaczmarski and Jakobowski 2015). Hence, the region has 
arguably become a certain backdoor into the EU and Europe at large for 
China’s political and business interests.   
Central and East European countries have had their own challenge with 
their membership in the 16+1 format. This is the first and only regional, 
institutionalized formation within the EU engaging with China. Although 
a number of larger member states have developed intensive bilateral 
relationships, other EU members and the European Commission have 
perceived 16+1 as a fragmentation of common diplomatic standing and 
trade and investment policies. This has been complicated by the fact 
that the 16+1 format also includes non-members of the Union. Latvia has 
grasped the sensitivity of the situation. In the context of Russia’s aggression 
in Ukraine, a common stance on foreign policy has been deemed of 
paramount importance for the country on the “frontline”. The summit in 
Riga emphasized synergy among the 16+1, the Belt and Road initiative 
and, indicatively, an EU-China common platform (Riga Guidelines 2016). 
This has been a skilful endeavour to engage all three. 
The Riga Summit pinpointed diversity within the 16+1 format. The Central 
and East European countries vary in terms of size and capacity, perceptions 
and interests, relations and affiliations. Most of the countries are members 
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of the EU and NATO. Five states have decided to integrate into the core of 
EU integration: monetary union. Poland is the only country from the region 
to become a founding member of the Chinese led Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. If one paraphrases Henry Kissinger and asks what is the 
phone number for Central and East Europe, there would not be a single 
response. Moreover, the stakeholders - governments, businesses, non-
governmental institutions - occasionally compete among themselves for 
access, attention and resources. Management of diversity becomes both 
a challenge and reflection of an ever-growing web of linkages, mutual 
interests and increasing connectivity.
Economic and Infrastructural Connectivity
Connectivity has become the defining feature of China’s modern Silk 
Road initiatives. Inter-civilizational and people-to-people engagement is 
important. At the same time, economic connectivity has also become one 
of the primary goals of both the 16+1 format and Belt and Road Initiative. 
The Medium Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and Central 
and Eastern European Countries, or Suzhou Guidelines, have underlined 
the intention that “China and CEECs will further facilitate mutual investment 
and trade and aim to make trade and investment relations one of the 
most dynamic growth points in 16+1 cooperation” (Medium Term Agenda 
2015). Trade and investment has already increased considerably. China’s 
65 USD billion trade with its Central and East European partners in 2015 
exceeded for the first time the trade with neighbouring Russia, which has 
been a traditionally close trading partner. However, it must be added that 
considerable and increasing trade deficits create some concerns and 
reservations on the part of the Central and Eastern European countries 
(Jitaru and Pralea 2016).
The Baltic countries, including Latvia, follow the general regional patterns 
of intensifying trade and investment interaction. Since the inauguration of 
the 16+1 format in 2012, Latvia-China trade has increased considerably 
(Andžāns and Bērziņa-Čerenkova 2017: 163-172). The trade growth was 
further facilitated by the recovery of Latvia and its Baltic neighbours from 
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a profound economic recession. Moreover, Latvian businesses began to 
look increasingly to the East to diversify its markets. Latvia has successfully 
gained a wider access to China’s market, exemplified by Latvia’s doubled 
export volumes to China in recent years. The agreement, which has 
provided access for Latvia’s fish and dairy products to China’s markets in 
2015, has demonstrated the positive dynamic of upgraded cooperation. 
Although Latvia still faces a sizeable trade balance deficit with China, an 
interest to advance mutually beneficial trade relations between the two 
sides apparently remains strong (Kučinskis 2016). 
Trade promotion and increasing mutual awareness has become an 
integral part of strengthening economic connectivity. The Belgrade 
Guidelines of 2014 encouraged and introduced a number of initiatives 
to promote mutual trade links (Belgrade Guidelines 2014). As one of the 
most visible results, China’s International Consumer Goods Fair in Ningbo 
has become a platform to advertise the products from the region in a 
specifically tailored fair for Central and East European countries. Latvia 
has actively taken advantage of the opportunity to motivate its country’s 
businesses and promote its goods in China. In this process, the major role 
has been played by Latvia’s Investment and Development Agency. This 
agency, responsible for coordinating and supporting foreign investment 
and trade cooperation, has actively disseminated information, engaged 
with entrepreneurs, set up a fair pavilion and, indicatively, established 
a representative office in Ningbo. These activities can be perceived as 
foundational to more intensified cooperation in the future (Latvian Ministry 
of Economics 2016). 
Mutual investment is slowly following a positive trend. The Baltic countries 
have also been willing to advertise their performance in developing and 
possessing intellectual capital, providing a professional workforce for 
businesses with a potential to establish regional R&D or technologically 
advanced business centres. However, attracting considerable investment 
from China to the Baltic countries has proven to be a challenging 
endeavour. The knowledge and experience of the region on the Chinese 
side appears to be rather limited. Moreover, the Baltic counterparts are 
just starting to gain knowledge of how to build trust and make concrete 
steps towards cooperation with their Chinese partners. The relatively 
small sizes of the countries, in a geopolitically challenging environment, 
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apparently dampened enthusiasm for immediate cooperation and 
direct linkages. Hence, the political, societal, institutional and increasingly 
business investment has yet to yield its economic fruits. 
The infrastructural connectivity of the East and West has become 
centrepiece of mutual interest and engagement. The development of 
the ‘hardware’ of transportation infrastructures and ‘software’ of a formal 
and informal regulatory framework has been at the heart of the modern 
Silk Road vision. Connectivity contributes to the synergy between the 
Belt and Road Initiative and 16+1 formats. The Suzhou Guidelines of 2015 
clearly prioritized the importance of the Eurasian transport corridor for 
China and its Central and East European partners: 
“The Participants will work to reinforce a safe and efficient 
connectivity network on land, at sea and in the air between 
China and Europe, in conjunction with key transport passages, 
linkages and projects, and jointly build the New Eurasian Land 
Bridge Economic Corridor. This way, the Participants hope to 
make fresh contribution to Eurasian connectivity.” (Medium Term 
Agenda 2015)
Central and East European countries have already been actively 
placing nationally advanced infrastructural projects on a common 
agenda. The region’s governments and businesses see the potential 
for Central and East Europe being a hub, bridge, and gateway 
between the East and West. Regional projects contribute to both 
complementarity and competition. 
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania have traditionally emphasized the 
region’s comparative advantages such as favourable location 
and considerable experience in transit and logistics. Their well-
developed port and railroad infrastructure has provided a basis for 
international business partnerships with the three Baltic countries. 
The transport sector has been a major source of revenue to the 
Baltic economies. The modern Silk Road idea and engagement 
with China has grasped the imagination of decision-makers and 
the business community of the Baltic nations. The Belt and Road 
Initiative has contributed to thinking about transcontinental 
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Eurasian transportation corridors. The 16+1 platform has provided 
a concrete platform to turn ideas into some concrete projects. But 
the location of the Baltic States and relatively small size also entail 
some limitations, so concrete results are yet to be seen. 
Latvia arguably has been most active among the Baltic nations in 
transport diplomacy. Latvia succeeded in becoming a coordinating 
country for logistics in the 16+1 format. It was decided at the Suzhou 
Summit in 2015 that Latvia would set up the CEEC-China Secretariat 
on Logistic Cooperation under the Ministry of Transport (CEEC-
China Secretariat 2017). The first 16+1 Transport Ministers’ meeting 
was held in Riga in May 2016. The country’s officials reiterated 
support for the New Silk Road initiative and the 16+1 format as “a 
significant platform for practical cooperation, attraction of new 
cargos and implementation of joint investment products in transport 
and logistics” (Ozoliņš 2016). Latvia has expressed its ambitions of 
being integrated into the Belt and Road transit and distribution 
networks and its expectations of attracting Chinese investment in 
infrastructure and transportation. A green-field or port infrastructure 
investment, or regional customer and executive centre for a major 
Chinese company, or increase of transportation flows through the 
region, would be deemed as a success.  
The overall support for intensifying infrastructural connectivity has 
hidden a diversity of approaches and interests. Implicit dilemmas 
exist on how to find the right balance and synergy between wider 
regional, national and intra-national interests and approaches. 
Chinese counterparts have emphasized inter-regional cooperation 
in promoting a mutual interconnectedness. The Baltic Sea ports 
have apparently been perceived in China’s approach in the wider 
context of Black Sea, Adriatic Sea and Baltic Sea connectivity. 
Indicatively, during the Transport Ministers’ meeting China’s 
representatives underlined the importance of the synergy between 
regional connectivity aspiration under the 16+1 framework, and EU 
regional policies such as the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
(Bērziņa-Čerenkova and Sprūds 2017). Although the Three Seas 
connectivity idea could contribute to the development of a South-
North Corridor in the CEE region, its economic value for the Baltic 
countries and its regional counterparts is not clear.
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The intra-regional and intra-national dynamics and competition 
further add to, and occasionally complicate, the complex 
connectivity agenda (Baltic News Service 2017). The Chinese side has 
indicated its interest in cooperation with the Baltic countries in the 
context of China-led development of the Great Stone Industrial park 
in Belarus. Given that Belarus is a landlocked country, a considerable 
potential exists to integrate the Baltic ports in a chain of supply and 
distribution (Korol 2016). Klaipeda port in Lithuania has apparently 
made the most tangible progress to become a regional partner, 
by integrating its facilities into the developing distribution network 
through existing and expanded railway infrastructure. Although the 
authorities of the largest Latvian ports of Riga and Ventspils have 
been promoting the idea of developing a logistics base in Latvia, 
in close cooperation with Chinese counterparts, international and 
intra-national competition has actually made it challenging to speak 
with a single voice even on a national level.  
The potential for China’s cooperation with Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania in infrastructural connectivity could proceed in multiple 
directions. Chinese businesses have demonstrated their interest 
in large-scale infrastructure projects in Central and East Europe, 
including the Baltic region. Rail Baltica, which plans to connect 
the three Baltic countries with a fast-speed European size railway 
system, has been an attractive large-scale infrastructural project. 
This EU supported project provides both investment opportunity 
and potentially profitable business prospects for the infrastructure 
developing and construction companies. At the same time, the EU 
legislative and regulatory framework creates strict and transparent 
tender conditions in a highly competitive business environment. 
Participation of China’s companies in the construction of this 
project has been discussed without the agreements being finalized 
(Baltic Course 2016). Similarly, the ideas of cooperation in the air 
transportation sector, and direct air connection between Latvia 
and China, have been deliberated but are yet to be developed. 
Hence, Latvia’s regional connectivity hub ambitions in the context 
of the Belt and Road Initiative and the 16+1 format continue to be 
in the making. 
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Beyond connectivity and CEE: strategic dimension of 
transcontinental visions
The Belt and Road Initiative is an ambitious vision that has encouraged 
enthusiasm and interest among many stakeholders. Countries in Central 
and East Europe unsurprisingly have rushed to the regional format of 
16+1 to speed up economic engagement with China, connectivity and 
infrastructural development and societal interaction. The modern Silk 
Road is still evolving a long-term vision with both economic and strategic 
implications. Although the economic rationale has dominated the 16+1 
agenda, the countries in the region may increasingly deliberate on the 
strategic and security dimension of China’s transcontinental vision of 
Eurasia. For Latvia, alongside its Baltic neighbours of Estonia and Lithuania, 
strategic assessment of their participation in a Chinese led agenda 
becomes an integral part of its strategic calculation.    
China’s opening Westward’s has an assortment of motivations. It may 
still be unclear what the geopolitical underpinnings of China’s vision 
are. However, China’s proactive stance, strategic concepts and 
growing economic presence are facilitating its increasing role in global 
governance and regional security affairs. China is steadily becoming a 
formative global security actor with its own interests and interpretations. 
China shapes globalization through its various connectivity initiatives. The 
New Silk Road concept combines China’s centred vision and unilateral 
approach with Western principles of regionalism and multilateralism 
(Kaczmarski 2016). This raises questions about whether China’s geopolitical 
agenda is actually converging or diverging with fundamental security 
paradigms and the interests of Central and Eastern European countries, 
including Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. The picture is clearly mixed.   
The convergence of interests between China and CEE countries takes 
place in Central Asia. Central Asia is vital in the context of developing 
critical infrastructure links for sustainable transcontinental transport 
corridors, and the vision of connectivity between the Eastern and Western 
parts of Eurasia. Stability in the heart of Asia is essentially a precondition 
for a successful Belt and Road Initiative and 16+1 cooperation. China 
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has become an indispensable actor in the diverse Central Asian region. 
China’s overall increasing political and economic presence and its 
Belt and Road Initiative may have positive implications for the region. 
Central Asian countries gain more room to manoeuvre to balance their 
dependence on Russia, receive an additional boost for economic growth 
and socio-economic stability, and could be motivated to cooperate more 
regionally. On the other hand, the Belt and Road Initiative’s resources may 
further deepen endemic corruption and regimes’ proclivity to tighten 
control in the context of growing interdependence (Ghiasy and Jiayi 
Zhou 2017: 19-28).
Latvia has had a proactive approach in Central Asia. Although one must 
not overestimate Latvia’s political and economic footprint in Central Asia, 
the country has played an active role in the region alongside such players 
as Germany in recent years. During its presidency of the EU Council in 
2015, Latvia built on previously established common experiences and 
cooperation. The presidency served as a platform to promote the country’s 
links and interests in Central Asia. Latvia supported a comprehensive review 
of the EU Strategy on Central Asia, and renewal of the position of the EU’s 
Special Representative for Central Asia (Pastore 2017: 151-162). Estonia 
intends to continue the trend during its EU presidency in the second part 
of 2017. Cooperation in border security, education and connectivity have 
been the top priorities on Latvia’s agenda. Latvia’s transport diplomacy 
and its endeavours to play a more important role in Eurasian transport 
corridors essentially started in the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, in the context of the Northern Distribution Network. The 
dilemmas created by a divergence of values and interests amongst 
the parties were largely solved in favour of practical and pragmatic 
cooperation. Apparently an interest-dominated approach may facilitate 
cooperation among a variety of stakeholders in Central Asia under the 
Belt and Road Initiative.
The implications of the Belt and Road Initiative for Russia and its role 
are more difficult to assess. Likewise, Russia’s strategic moves may have 
mixed consequences for the Initiative and its connectivity dimension. 
Russia’s sovereign multipolar thinking makes it a complicated partner in 
transcontinental win-win endeavours. Russia’s assertiveness in the post-
Soviet space, which it apparently is willing to approach as its backyard, 
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preclude from building a wider community of mutual trust and respect. 
Quite the opposite, Russia’s aggressiveness in Ukraine invoked ghosts of 
insecurity and neo-imperialism and was a regional security wake-up call for 
many neighbouring countries. Moreover, Russia promotes and develops 
its own integration project of the Eurasian Economic Union, including in 
Central Asia, and has approached jealously any potentially competitive 
visions (Makocki and Popescu 2016: 47-49). The time of overlapping 
integrative spaces in Russian strategic thinking has evidently passed.   
On the other hand, the picture is more complex when accounting for 
China’s relationship with Russia. China has become a vital and strategic 
partner for Russia in the so-called anti-hegemonic and multipolar world 
approach. Russia and China have been able, so far, to arrive at some 
division of labour in Central Asia. While Russia has been largely shaping 
military and political developments, China has ensured its predominant 
economic presence. Moreover, Russia and China have strategically 
promoted closer economic cooperation between themselves, especially 
in the energy sector. Development of transport corridors through Russia 
in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative may provide Russia with 
both economic gains and political leverages in the wider Eurasian area 
(Kaczmarski and Rodkiewicz 2016).
Russian assertiveness has undoubtedly alarmed Central and Eastern 
European countries. Western sanctions and deterrence measures 
against Russia have demonstrated even wider consensus and 
understanding in the Euro-Atlantic Community of Russia’s dangerous 
strategic behaviour. Russia and China’s forging of an alliance to 
promote a post-Western world adds to the strategic dilemmas for 
NATO and the EU, especially their Central and Eastern European 
members. At the same time, economics matter. Sanctions fatigue 
is noticeable. Russia’s enormous territorial landmass makes it 
indispensable for implementing the connectivity vision of the Belt 
and Road Initiative. Central and Eastern Europeans have most to lose 
from Russia’s aggressive undertakings, but they also have the most to 
gain from constructive and pragmatic economic engagement with a 
large neighbour. Latvia faces this Central and East European dilemma 
even more acutely due to direct proximity to Russia. Russian military 
exercises remind Latvia regularly of its insecurity concerns, while cargo 
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flows from Russia of mutual economic interest, perhaps even necessity 
from the Latvian perspective. Latvians are willing to cooperate with 
Russia and its EEU partners of Belarus and Kazakhstan economically, 
despite the existing sanction regime. Hence, the visions and agendas 
of the 16+1 and Belt and Road Initiatives, and especially its connectivity 
priority in Central and East Europe in general and Baltics in particular, 
are caught in the crossfire of ambitions, compromises and geopolitical 
developments.  
EU-China engagement adds to the complexity of the situation. The 
EU’s new Global Strategy declares that the EU will “pursue a coherent 
approach to China’s connectivity drives westwards” (European 
Union 2016). However, the “coherent approach” is apparently in 
making. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on an EU-
China Connectivity Platform to “enhance synergies” between the 
Belt and Road Initiative and EU’s Investment Plan for Europe might 
not be enough. Europe is clearly placed in China’s transcontinental 
strategic vision. The Belt and Road and 16+1 initiatives are motivating 
the EU to think more strategically. The EU-China Connectivity Platform 
will not become a substitute for strategic vision and will not create a 
community of the like-minded in Eurasia. The EU may need to put more 
emphasis on promoting a rules based global order for global and 
regional governance. Although clearly the “rules based order” could 
be interpreted through the prism of national interests, a number of 
agendas converge. The EU and China are both interested in dealing 
with current traditional and non-traditional global and regional security 
challenges such as terrorism, cyber security, energy and environment, 
human development and resilience. This creates a platform for more 
coherent engagement (Ghiasy and Zhou 2017: 45-56). 
The 16+1 format comes into the strategic picture of EU-China relations 
as both a nuisance for Brussels and dynamic test ground for a further 
engagement. The 16+1 initiative has been perceived by some in the 
EU as China’s deliberate creation of its regional “Trojan horse” in the 
EU policy-making corridors (Stanzel et al. 2016). On the other hand, in 
the absence of common voice, the 16+1 platform has become a test 
ground for also developing the EU’s strategic thinking and practical 
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Conclusions
China’s transcontinental connectivity initiatives have obtained momentum. 
This is a success in times of uncertainty. The Belt and Road Initiative remains 
a non-institutionalized cooperation work-in-progress and will be shaped by 
a variety of stakeholders. The 16+1 format has developed into a dynamic 
institutionalized platform with a spectrum of challenges and opportunities. 
Positive spill-over from this vision of engagement, intensifying economic 
cooperation and regional stability will depend on mutual interest and the 
ability to harmonize competing interests and find synergy. A number of 
synergies must be achieved in the Eurasian space to achieve political, 
human, economic and infrastructural connectivity. The European Union, 
Eurasian Economic Union, Eastern Partnership and Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization are only a few institutional frameworks and initiatives that 
must be taken into account.  
Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, alongside other CEE countries, have been 
pro-active to facilitate cooperative efforts and extend the mutually 
beneficial political, economic and people-to-people engagement with 
China. The Fifth Summit of the Prime Ministers of China and Central and 
Eastern European countries in Latvia’s capital Riga, in November 2016, 
was indicative of the interest in and understanding of the importance of 
cooperation with China. The Baltic States have been closely engaged in 
Baltic Sea region interaction and have fully integrated into the European 
Union. Latvia deems the 16+1 format as an important complementary 
platform to the wider EU-China dialogue, and has supported the vision of 
the Belt and Road. The prospects of cooperation between China and its 
Central and Eastern European counterparts have been and will be shaped 
by an assortment of challenges and opportunities. The synergy of the two 
initiatives becomes both a significant measurement and prerequisite for 
further development of mutually beneficial partnerships. Latvia, alongside 
other Baltic countries, faces its own choices of striking the right balance 
in a productive engagement with China in the context of its flagship 
initiatives. Thus, for Central and East European countries, especially small 
countries like Latvia, these Chinese initiatives create both challenges and 
opportunities. Yet, playing proactively at several diplomatic and business 
chessboards has become a matter of necessity rather than choice.
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